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Abstract
Asset Protection in a Limited Swarm Environment Utilizing Artificial Potential
Fields
Dieter Laskowski
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Asset protection is a behavior in which a team of robots establishes a formation around
a resource marked as an asset in a hostile environment in order to protect the asset from
threats. The robots are assumed to be homogeneous and run a decentralized control algo-
rithm and possess a repulsive quality to the threats. Previous works in this area have used
centralized control or considered the use of many robots. This work aims at developing an
algorithm that is both decentralized, and able to protect assets using only a few robots.
In order to provide this behavior an algorithm coined the Asset Guarding Intelligent
System (AeGIS), was developed and analyzed. Using AeGIS, each robot will detect an
asset move towards it and form a protective formation around it. AeGIS utilizes Quadratic
Artificial Potential Fields (QAPFs) as the robot’s path planning module. As such the fields
are designed to move the robots into formation, avoid collisions, and in turn protect assets.
AeGIS is tested using Leviathan — an event-driven simulator designed to test groups
of autonomous swarm robots employing distributed control algorithms. The success rate
of different variations of AeGIS were tested. Additionally, the number of threats, robots
employing AeGIS, and the number and mobility of assets were varied to observe their effect
on the success rate. The simulation results show that with sufficient number of robots, the
assets, static or mobile are well protected against 20 modeled threats. Through these results
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The term “robot” was first used in Karel Capek’s play, Rossum’s Universal Robots in 1929
in which the robots were a race of workers created by the play’s inventor, Rossum, from
a vat of biological parts. Capek coined the workers “robots,” a term derived from the
Czech word robota, which is loosely translated as menial laborer [9]. To this end “Rossums
Universal Robots” demonstrated how robots were able to replace “real” people from any
type of labor that was deemed too lowly to merit respect, subsequently freeing humans to
do more meaningful work.
Today robots are still used to replace workers in roles where a robot’s precision, ability
to repeat a task accurately, and their expendability make them more desirable in a role than
a human worker. Robots have been used in applications ranging from robotic welding arms
in production lines, to robotic vacuum cleaners, to bomb defusal and search and rescue
robots.
Some of these robots are considered to be autonomous, which means that they think
and act on their own without human interaction or direction. This level of autonomy opens
up the use of autonomous robots to be left to complete a task unsupervised by humans,
freeing them to perform other tasks as in Capek’s play. Commonly the tasks assigned
to autonomous robots can be accomplished faster through the use of multiple autonomous
robots, other times the task may be impossible without the use of multiple robots. The coop-
eration of multiple robots to complete a common task is aptly called Cooperative Robotics,
1
and is described in detail in Section 1.2.
Cooperative robotics may be utilized in a manner that would allow multiple autonomous
robots to perform the tasks previously described that would be too dangerous for human
workers. One of the main motivations for robotics research is the desire to remove humans
from dangerous work and replace them with an expendable robot. One such task is that of
asset protection.
Asset protection, as it sounds, is the protection of resources labeled as assets from harm.
The need for asset protection arises from the presence of a resource in a hostile environ-
ment. This resource is in the hostile environment for any number of reasons, whether the
resource is trapped there, has a particular task to perform within the environment, or simply
needs to traverse the environment in order to deliver supplies, information, or get home. In
any case the resource is valuable to the implementer, so it will be marked as an asset.
Typically the nature of the hostile environment will not be known aside from its disposi-
tion. A hostile environment will have agents that can do harm to the asset; as such they will
be labeled as threats. As the nature of the environment is not usually known beforehand,
the strength, number and location of these threats is unknown to the asset, so it cannot plan
to avoid them. The asset is left defenseless against the threat.
For whatever reason the asset is in the hostile environment it becomes necessary to
have a general, flexible response to threats. This problem is posed generally as the “asset
protection” problem. Assuming that enough is known about the hostile environment that a
number of robots may be equipped that will be able to repel these threats, the robots can be
used to protect the asset from the threats. With this information the problem itself can be
properly formulated.
1.1 Problem Statement
Given an environment in which assets are defined and threats are present, a number of
autonomous robots will need to protect assets from the threats by utilizing the repulsive
2
Figure 1.1: n nodes near a assets in a 2D field of set dimensions, just as t threats appear on the field.
effect the nodes have on the threats.
The environment is a 2D field of fixed dimensions that will contain a assets, n nodes and
t threats during the course of a simulation. Initially n nodes are present in the simulation
and turned on, followed by a assets being defined within the environment, followed by t
threats, alerted to the assets’ presence in the field attempting to compromise the asset.
Multiple threats appear in the environment after the assets are identified and employ
their own path planning algorithm to avoid the nodes and reach the assets. These threats
exploit their knowledge of the environment and have omniscient information about the
locations of the assets and nodes.
Conversely the assets are of singular purpose and pay no heed to efforts or locations of
the nodes in the environment. The assets can either be stationary, as if performing a task at
a location, or mobile, attempting to get from one location to another.
In either case the nodes attempt to form a protective formation around the assets. Ideally
this would consist of many nodes forming a circle coincident on the asset leaving no en-
trance for a threat to get to the asset, but in many cases the resources would not be available
to supply this many nodes. Alternatives to the circular protective formation may be needed
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when there are not enough nodes to form a robust circular formation. For this reason and
the purposes of asset protection, any formation, structure, or behavior of nodes that result
in an asset being protected from a threat will be considered asset protection.
Constructing such behavior on numerous robots of limited capabilities is a non-trivial
matter. The behavior must be able to protect the assets from threats when there are “suf-
ficient nodes” to produce a robust circle formation, but able to alter their formation based
on the number of nodes in formation without communicating with each other. In order
to provide such a behavior Artificial Potential Fields (APFs) are employed to construct an
asset protection behavior that is robust to individual node failure, but simple enough to be
used on robots of limited means. This solution to the asset protection problem is called
the Asset Guarding Intelligent System (AeGIS). Details on the AeGIS algorithm used is
described in Section 3.6 while APF functionality in general can be found in Section 1.3.
1.2 Cooperative Robotics
The concept of cooperative robotics entails a group of robots that work together to achieve
a common goal. Algorithms within the field of cooperative robotics are commonly divided
into two categories; centralized and decentralized.
Centralized robot controllers use a single entity (computer, other robot, etc.) that tells
each robot what to do. A centralized controller is typically chosen for environments in
which the coordination of the robots needs to be carefully orchestrated and knowledge of
the environment is easily attainable. Centralized robot controllers typically have either
global knowledge, or the collective knowledge of each of the robots it controls meaning it
will always have more knowledge than any singular robot would. Using this knowledge
the centralized controller can easily make informed decisions and send the robots accurate
instructions throughout the course of the mission.
Decentralized robot controllers trade optimal knowledge and coordination for system
wide robustness. Decentralized controllers have each robot in the system take readings
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from the environment and decide what its next action is on its own. This process of in-
dependent control introduces system wide robustness in the sense that if any robot is dis-
abled, or otherwise rendered ineffective, the system will continue to operate normally with
the exception of the affected robot. In a centralized controller, if the controller is disabled,
or receives bad information, or is unable to transmit instructions, the entire system will be
rendered ineffective. However this trade off typically means that complicated tasks requir-
ing coordination of multiple robots will be much harder to accomplish in the decentralized
controller.
Cooperative robots have been used in a number of scenarios in an effort to remove hu-
mans from menial or dangerous tasks. Some such tasks would be those such as coordinated
group movement of an object [6, 15], escorting a target by surrounding it and maintaining
formation relative to the target’s position [3], and robot soccer [20].
1.3 Artificial Potential Fields
Artificial Potential Fields (APFs) are a simple mathematical path planning algorithm based
on naturally occurring potential such as gravitational potential or electrical potential. APFs
are commonly described using functions for their compactness and computational speed
and are sometimes for this reason called Artificial Potential Functions.
Agents interact with the fields as Newtonian Particles, resulting in them needing to fol-
low Newton’s force laws with respect to gravitational potential. In this manner the potential
fields exert a force upon the particles in the system in the direction of the lowest potential.
In order to determine these forces the force vector is defined as the negative gradient of the
potential field.
F⃗ = −∇P (1.1)
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In order for these forces to be useful as a path planning algorithm the virtual environ-
ment must be shaped in a way that the forces will lead the agent away from obstacles and
ultimately towards its goal. Taking note of this, each object in the environment is given a
potential field, either attractive or repulsive. Significant locations in the environment can
also be given potential fields. Obstacles will be given repulsive potential fields and goals
will be given attractive potential fields.
A repulsive potential field can take many shapes, but keying off of the concept of gravi-
tational potential, a repulsive potential field will have a high potential at the origin, tapering
off to lower potentials as distance from the origin increases until the limit of the repulsive
field at which the field would be level with the rest of the environment, producing no force.
An example of such a repulsive potential field can be seen in Figure 1.2a. When the force
gradient is calculated for the repulsive APF, it should point away from the origin of the
field.
An attractive potential field is created in much the same manner as the repulsive po-
tential field. In order to produce an attractive potential field the origin of the field must
be surrounded by rings of successively higher potential so that when the force gradient is
calculated it will point towards the origin of the field. An example of such an attractive
potential field can be seen in Figure 1.2b
Navigation of an environment that contains both goals and obstacles using APFs still
involves calculating the force vector produced by the fields. The environment can be de-
scribed by the collection of all the potential fields in the environment. The fields are col-
lected by calculating an aggregate potential field by summing each of the individual po-
tential fields relative to their position in the environment. From this point the force vector
acting on the agent can be determined by calculating the negative gradient at the agent’s
position in the aggregate potential field.





























(b) A purely attractive potential field centered at (0,0)





Commonly the APFs are stored as functions in order to reduce the storage required and
speed up computations for potential field values. One of the methods to produce simple
attractive and repulsive potential fields is to describe them using radial potential field func-
tions. In a radial potential field function, the potential field is described by an equation
whose only parameter is distance from the origin. One such APF is shown in Figure 1.4.
When using functions to describe APFs, the APFs are centered at the origin, resulting in
the use of localization variables to place the APF within the virtual environment. These
variables are in fact the coordinates of the objects with which the APF is associated.
Ptotal(x, y) = P1(x− x1, y − y1) + P2(x− x2, y − y2) + · · ·+ Pn(x− xn, y − yn) (1.4)
In (1.4) the localization variables, xi and yi are the location of each of the objects in
the virtual environment. If the functions are a function of distance from the origin, then














Figure 1.3: Aggregate APF of a goal at (0,0) and an obstacle at (1,0)























(b) The same potential field function plotted in 3D
Figure 1.4: A potential field function plotted in 2D in terms of distance (Figure 1.4a), and that same
potential field function used as a radial APF and plotted in 3D (Figure 1.4b)
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√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 which results in (1.5), where d is distance from the origin.
Ptotal(x, y) = P1(
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2) + P2(
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2) + . . .
+ Pn(
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2)
Ptotal(x, y) = P1(d) + P2(d) + · · ·+ Pn(d) (1.5)





Computation of the force vector acting on the agent can be further accelerated by taking
advantage of the aggregate potential field being described as a sum of functions, in which
the aggregate force acting on the agent can be calculated by a single derivative over the
equation describing the aggregate potential field, since the potential field has been reduced
to a single variable of distance from the origin of each field. Additionally, since the field is
radial the force vector will point either towards the origin or away from the origin based on

























Equation (1.8) results in a compact simple method for calculating the force vector acting
on an agent at any location in the environment. Using this relationship the net force acting
on an agent at any point in the environment can be quickly calculated by finding the distance
9
Figure 1.5: The box canyon problem exists when a robot may be attracted into a local minima with
no desire to leave.
from the agent to each object in the environment and summing the force vectors, producing
the direction and magnitude that the agent should move in.
However APFs do have a few notable disadvantages when compared to other path plan-
ning algorithms. Some behaviors may be difficult or almost impossible to describe using
APFs, while complicated behaviors may still take a very long time to design. Another prob-
lem that APFs incur is that of local minima. A local minima in an APF is a point where the
agent has no force vector acting upon it, though a global minima (point of lower potential)
that is more desirable exists elsewhere in the environment. An example of a local minima
is shown in Figure 1.5 as the box canyon scenario. In this scenario the agent is drawn into
the canyon by the goal beyond it. Once the agent is within the box canyon it encounters
the repulsive force of the canyon itself, and since it still sees the goal beyond the canyon it
doesn’t attempt to escape the canyon itself; it is caught in a local minima.
There are however some solutions to the local minima problem, including stream func-
tions [21], introducing an excitation factor or randomness to shake the robot out of the local
minima [5], and others [19, 13].
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Figure 1.6: A typical QAPF using the equation P (x) = (x− 1)2.
1.3.1 Quadratic Artificial Potential Fields
APFs can take many forms, and the equations describing them can be as complex or as
simple as the implementer desires, however they are often kept simple in order to maintain
the algorithmic nimbility for which they often are utilized.
Quadratic Artificial Potential Fields (QAPFs) demonstrate the two main forces em-
ployed in applications of APFs: attraction and repulsion. A QAPF typically takes the
shape of a parabola in such a manner that it generates short range repulsion and long range
attraction. These fields are useful for purposes where the agent is needed to maintain a
distance, but still stay near to another agent or object. A normal QAPF can be tuned in the
same manner that a parabolic equation can (Figure 1.6).
An additional amount of configuration can be included by making the QAPF a piece-
wise function in which each lobe of the QAPF has its own tuning coefficient, and a common
centering point.
In this manner a QAPF may be tuned to have a stronger repulsive force than attractive
force or however the implementer decides to design it. The force equation is calculated by
taking the derivative of each lobe individually.
The QAPF can also be manipulated in a manner that it exhibits a purely attractive or
11







Figure 1.7: A QAPF that has been tuned for a stronger repulsion (steeper slope) than attraction.
purely repulsive force by negating one of the lobes completely. This is demonstrated in
Figure 1.8 where the field retains only repulsive behavior.
1.4 Swarm Robotics
Swarm intelligence is described as a set of simple behaviors that when followed by each
member of the swarm will produce a group, or emergent behavior. A swarm environment
is most commonly characterized as a decentralized control algorithm employed on homo-
geneous robots that are programmed with relatively simple behaviors that together display
some emergent behavior [4].
Swarm robotics is based on the observation of swarms in nature such as bees, ants and
other creatures. In each one of these swarms, when a single agent is taken out of the swarm
it will exhibit simple individual behavior, when there are many agents however, they act as
a swarm they can accomplish large tasks.
Various species of ants cooperate without direct communication, though modifications
of the environment called stigmergy [6]. Through stigmergy ants cooperate to bring large
prey back to the hive, prey that individually they would not be able to bring back. The
indirect communication exhibits itself as constructing a pheromone trail to lead other ants
12








Figure 1.8: Purely repulsive APF by only utilizing the repulsive component of the QAPF by way of
a piecewise equation
to the prey, and through physical pushing of the prey they eventually decide on a direction
to move.
In a limited swarm environment the number of agents in the system is substantially
smaller than that of a typical swarm. Typical swarms employ between hundred and tens of
thousands of agents. Swarms in robotics typically do not reach this size in experimentation
due to their cost, however they can be achieved in simulation. Swarms in robotics have
been seen as small as 10-20 robots, but a limited swarm environment would have its target
population between 5-20 robots.
1.5 Flocking
One of the most effective forms of formation control observed in nature is a behavior recog-
nized as flocking. Flocking is a method that organisms utilize to avoid predators, increase
survival chances and in some cases even reduce strain on travel.
Flocking as it is known today in computer science circles originated with Reynolds who
was searching for an easy way to generate paths of birds and fish while creating computer
animated scenes. Before the development and application of Reynolds’ flocking rules the
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path for each object in the flock would have to be individually plotted out by the animator.
Now with Reynolds’ rules, only the leader of the flock’s path must be scripted leaving the
rest of the flock mates to “flock.” Reynolds’ rules of flocking follow [12].
1. Collision Avoidance: avoid collisions with nearby flockmates
2. Velocity Matching: attempt to match velocity (a vector quantity) with nearby flock-
mates
3. Flock Centering: attempt to stay close to nearby flockmates
Collision avoidance manifests itself as a short range repulsive force between flock-
mates, and velocity matching is somewhat complimentary. These two behaviors are also
sometimes referred to as static collision avoidance and dynamic collision avoidance. Static
collision avoidance considers only the location of the flockmates, ignoring velocity, which
makes it similar to the collision avoidance behavior seen in APFs, while dynamic collision
avoidance is based only on velocity of flockmates and ignores location. As Reynolds puts
it, “if the [member of the flock] does a good job of matching velocity with its neighbors, it
is unlikely that it will collide with any of them very soon.”
Flock centering is a behavior that makes the member want to be in the middle of the
flock. If a member is deep in the flock, the presence of flock members around it will cause
it to be pulled at roughly the same strength in all directions resulting in a near zero sum
force. But if a flock member is on the outside of a flock, it will be pulled towards the center
of the flock. This behavior can be drawn easily from the protective quality of flocks seen
in nature. It is flock centering that essentially makes the flock a cohesive entity.
These flocking rules are implemented on all flock members besides the leader as a
distributed control algorithm. When each member of the flock adheres to these three rules
the flock appears to be cohesive and act as an entity with a single mind.
Reynolds noted that the flocks seemed to behave more real when the sensing range was
limited. With a limited sensing range the individual members would be happy with their
14
position in the flock as long as their neighbors do not change, so a flock would be able to
conduct various maneuvers that would respond to obstacles or predators.
It’s not a far stretch to see how Reynolds’ flocking rules can be implemented using APFs
[16, 17]. Additionally flocking can easily be adapted to escorting objects or members of
the flock by having the flock treat the object as a flockmate and the object being controlled
independently.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
The layout of this work is as follows: Chapter 2 goes over works done by other researchers
similar to this problem. Chapter 3 will detail the algorithms used to model asset and threat
behavior, as well as explain in detail the node’s asset protection algorithm, AeGIS. Chapter
4 discusses the architecture of the simulator used to simulate the algorithms described in
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 shows the simulation parameters and the simulation results. Finally





Several strategies have been attempted in order to solve what is commonly described as
the Entrapment/Escorting scenario. Entrapment is the act of robots surrounding an object
preventing its escape by creating a surrounding formation. This formation is also called
a “containment” formation due to its use to “contain” the object to its current location.
Escorting is the act of achieving an entrapment or containment formation, but not using it
to keep the object in place and instead maintain a formation around the object and guiding
it along its path, or protecting it from outside threats.
2.1 Centralized Controller for Entrapment/Escorting
Antonelli et al.’s approach to the entrapment/escorting problem utilizes a centralized con-
troller employing their Null Space Based (NSB) control method to manipulate a multirobot
system to escort an object in both a simulated environment, and a physical one.
The NSB control method attempts to find a move for each robot that will satisfy a
set of subproblems that will be individually solved, and then based on the priority given
to each subproblem combine the solutions into one move. NSB control utilizes a task
Jacobian matrix, commonly utilized in robotic manipulation, to find a “closed-loop inverse
kinematics least-square solution.” Antonelli et al. claim that the NSB control method
“always fulfills” the highest priority task by making sure that none of the solutions to the
lower priority tasks conflict with the solution for the highest priority task [3]. In the event
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that two solutions do conflict with each other the components of the lower priority tasks
that conflict with the highest priority task are removed from the final move of the robot.
In order for NSB control to be applied to the escorting mission it was broken down into
four subproblems:
1. Command the robots’ centroid to be coincident with the target
2. Move the robots on a given circumference around the centroid
3. Properly distribute the robots along the circumference
4. Avoid collisions among the robots themselves and with obstacles
Antonelli et al. ran several simulations varying the priorities given to these subtasks in
order to see how the NSB controller combined these tasks, and what would be the optimal
priority. The simulations showed that given a satisfactory ordering of the subtasks the
robots were able to converge on the target quickly and accurately.
University of Cassino’s (UNICAS) Industrial Automation Laboratory’s (LAI) multi-
robot setup includes six Khepera II robots with Bluetooth modules and a computer system
that reads the robots’ position on a smooth table via two overhead video cameras. The
computer system consists of a computer running Windows XP that reads the camera im-
ages via frame grabbers and sends the acquired image to a Linux-based PC which runs the
NSB control algorithm and transmits the movement information to the robots (Figure 2.1).
Needless to say this makes the control algorithm centralized.
The experimental results as shown on DAEIMI’s website1 show that NSB control is
both accurate and robust in its ability to deal with robot fault. Additionally the system
appears to react quickly to change in target position (escorting) and maintain a stable for-
mation around the target. For their target in their experiments the robots escort a tennis ball
that is given an impulse by one of the authors in the lab.
1http://webuser.unicas.it/lai/robotica/Video.html
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Figure 2.1: University of Cassino’s Industrial Automation Laboratory setup
(http://webuser.unicas.it/lai/robotica/Laboratory.html).
However the Robotics Research Group at DAEIMI has also experimented with decen-
tralized control schemes and applied them to flocking algorithms as evidenced by the videos
on their website and published papers on flocking [2], however it does not appear that they
have taken to decentralizing their NSB control scheme at this time, though they do express
an interest in doing so.
Another group that has attempted to solve the entrapment/escorting mission utilizing a
centralized controller is Mas et al. who use a “cluster-space” approach which groups the
n-robots of a system as a single entity, and constructing Jacobian and Inverse Jacobian ma-
tricies to find the inverse kinematic solution to place their three degree of freedom robots
at the desired locations [7]. As with Antonelli et al., Mas et al. plan to look into decentral-
izing their approach to the entrapment/escorting algorithm in order to reap the benefits of a
decentralized algorithm.
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Figure 2.2: Experimental run of DAEIMI’s NSB behavior used to entrap a tennis ball. The time
lapse from the first frame to the last is said to be ≈ 5s [3].
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Figure 2.3: The same simulation as seen in Figure 2.2 but with a fault induced. In the second
frame the robot is removed from formation and in the third frame it is shown that the other robots
in formation adjust their position to continue entrapment. In the fourth frame the disabled robot is
reintroduced and rejoins the formation. Total time elapsed is ≈ 11s [1].
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2.2 Social Potential Fields
Reif and Wang at Duke University experimented with setting up a framework in which
APFs were used to form relationships between different groups of robots by setting up
different APFs for each group, defining intra- and inter-group behaviors [11]. They hoped
that by setting up this framework that APFs could be designed in a scalable manner so
that they could be applied to Very Large Scale Robotics (VLSR) and be applied to both
industrial and military applications. A VLSR system as described by Reif and Wang would
target between hundreds and tens of thousands of robots.
The social potential field framework is a distributed control mechanism across the
VLSR system of homogeneous robots. These robots are divided up into groups of which
intra-group (within the group) and inter-group (other groups) behavior is defined. Through
this process, groups and relationships are defined that produce the desired behaviors.
Reif and Wang’s approach involved the use of inverse-power laws to define their poten-
tial fields. The inverse-power law is described as being similar to those found in molecular
dynamics, in which a field can exhibit long-range attraction, but short-range repulsion.
Their example inverse-power law characterized by (2.1) embodies both attractive and re-
pulsive forces.




c1, c2 ≥ 0, σ1 > σ2 > 0
(2.1)
In (2.1) the function can be tuned by altering the parameters σ1, σ2, c1 and c2. Attraction
is controlled by the term c2/rσ2 while repulsion is controlled by −c1/rσ1 . When c1, c2 > 0,
assuring positive attraction and repulsion forces the inverse-power law becomes a cluster-
ing force law. The strength of the attraction and repulsion can be tuned using σ1 and σ2.
When σ1 > σ2 > 0 the repulsive force will dominate at short distances while the attraction
will have a stronger effect over long distances. The distance at which these forces take
effect are also affected by values of σ1 and σ2. As Reif and Wang state, a big σ1 implies
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Figure 2.4: Magnitude of the inverse force law using σ1 = 3.0, σ2 = 0.8, c1 = 20 and c2 = 15.
Derived using (2.1) from Reif and Wang [11]
that repulsion will be strong at short ranges, will decay rapidly with distance, while a small
σ2 will give the attractive force a stronger long range effect.
The process to which these potential fields are designed to function in the social poten-
tial field framework is proposed to be as follows:
1. Specify the required behavior
2. Design intra-group forces
3. Design inter-group forces
4. Define the dynamic element of the potential force laws
Reif and Wang test this approach in several scenarios, from the simple task of clustering
to the relatively complex behavior described as bivouacking. The most relevant scenario
they test is a scenario called “guarding a castle.”
In the “guarding a castle” scenario three groups of robots are defined: the castle, the
guards and the attacker. The castle is represented by a singular “landmark” robot, which
is a type of robot used to mark a location and does not have the capability to move. The
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.5: Three different stages in Reif and Wang’s castle guarding scenario [11]. In Figure
2.5a the initial setup is shown with many “guards” and one landmark robot (circled) that acts as
the “castle.” In Figure 2.5b the state of the system is shown after the guards have taken formation
around the castle. In Figure 2.5c an attacker (circled) is shown attempting to find vulnerabilities in
the castle’s protection, and the guards are seen chasing after the attacker
guards are represented by a number of identical robots and the attacker, or invader consists
of only one robot.
Force laws are defined such that the guards are attracted to the castle, but repelled to
a distance away from it to simulate a perimeter. Additionally the guards are repelled by
each other to spread out the formation and avoid collisions. The guards are attracted to the
attacker, but the attraction is weak enough that the guards tend to stay near the castle. The
attacker is then designed to be attracted to the castle but repelled by the guards.
Reif and Wang observe that this behavior can be achieved without defining complicated
rules that each robot has to follow to achieve the desired result. To this end it is proposed
that many complex behaviors can be implemented by defining multiple groups of robots
and their inter- and intra-group actions.
As an extension, Reif and Wang discuss the application of spring laws in an attempt to
form what they describe as “exact structures.” Hooke’s spring restoration force laws are
applied to robots in such a manner that they will form a predefined formation based on the
number of connections and the strength of the “springs” themselves. This concept of using
a specific set of laws in order to create what Reif and Wang describe as an exact structure
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is important to note, as it may be applied to formation control or flocking.
2.3 Threat Containment
Threat containment is a variation of the entrapment problem where the objects to be en-
trapped are threats. In order to pacify the environment, robots actively seek out threats in
the environment to surround, and thus contain the threat’s impact to the rest of the environ-
ment.
Mehendale designed the event driven simulator MAHESHDAS to simulate a swarm
environment in which threats would be created randomly throughout the course of the
simulation and it would be up to a number of robots to surround and contain them [8].
The approach was based on QAPFs that would hold the robots in a radial formation around
the threat, while a special node spreading force would attempt to assure that the nodes were
spread out around the threat in addition to the normal node to node repulsive force.
Ransom also worked on this problem and enhanced the success rate of threat contain-
ment by using ad-hoc wireless networks set up by the robots to control the number of nodes
containing a single threat [10]. Ransom noticed that in some cases the robots would have
a disproportionate number of robots containing a single threat, while other threats in the
environment were not contained, or had inadequate containment. Using wireless networks
the robots could control the number of nodes at a single threat by making robots just ar-
riving to the threat ask for permission to join the containment formation. Additionally the
wireless networks were used to maintain formation by each robot identifying and com-
municating with its neighbors, and Ransom’s Mid-Angle Formation Algorithm (MAFA)
ensuring equal distribution around the threat.
Both Mehendale and Ransom’s algorithms rely on having a superior number of robots to
threats. In both Mehedale and Ransom’s work, the threats were containable, meaning that
there were no difficulties to containing a threat once it was located. Ransom experimented
with using mobile threats for threat containment but found that as the threat’s maximum
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velocity approached that of the node’s, the containment success rate fell sharply.
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Chapter 3
AeGIS Asset Protection Algorithm
Asset protection itself involves identifying what the assets are in the environment. This
means an asset can take the form of something static (something that does not move) such
as a building or physical location, or something dynamic (something that moves) such as
a convoy or person. The labeling of assets can be done in any environment at the imple-
menter’s discretion, but for the purposes of simulation it will be done by the simulator as
described in Section 4.2.
From this point, asset protection involves forming a protection algorithm to protect the
assets from the threats. The manner in which this is done is highly interdependent on the
capabilities and behaviors of each of the agents, which will be discussed throughout this
chapter.
The asset protection algorithm has gone through many stages of development and rede-
velopment based on incremental testing and analysis of results. In this manner each of the
three agents involved in this algorithm were added and their features tested. This chapter
describes the capabilities and algorithms employed by each of the three agents in the asset
protection scenarios, assets, threats and nodes.
All agents share the following simulator properties. The agents are modeled as a cir-
cular robot in a 2D plane with a fixed radius. Their location, or state, is stored using a
coordinate system that keeps track of their position, (x, y) and orientation, θ. Their loco-
motion is modeled as a two wheeled robot with differential drive by the locomotion module
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Table 3.1: Table of Variables and Constants used in Equations
Variable Meaning
Pat Potential Field Assets exert on Threats
Pnt Potential Field Nodes exert on Threats
Pan Potential Field Assets exert on Nodes
Pnn Potential Field Nodes exert on Nodes
Ptn Potential Field Threats exert on Nodes
Ptt Potential Field Threats exert on Threats
αat Coefficient that controls the force of Pat
αrn Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the repulsive component of Pan
αan Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the attractive component of Pan
ηrt Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the repulsive component of Pnt
ηrn Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the repulsive component of Pnn
τrn Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the repulsive component of Ptn
τan Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the attractive component of Ptn
τrt Coefficient that controls the magnitude of the repulsive component of Ptt
dat Distance from Asset to Threat
dnt Distance from Node to Threat
dr Distance from Asset to Node
dnn Distance from Node to Node
dtn Distance from Threat to Node
dtt Distance from Threat to Threat
ddnt The Distance Threats desire to be away from Nodes
ddrn The Distance Nodes desire to be away from Assets
ddnn The Distance Nodes desire to be away from Nodes
ddtn The Distance Nodes desire to be away from Threats
ddaa The Minimum Distance Assets are allowed to be from each other
ddtt The Distance Threats desire to be away from Threats
(Section 4.5.3) and their speed, both linear and rotational is limited to values specified by
the user.
3.1 Asset Capabilities
The assets are considered to be “dumb” agents, in that their movements are not as complex
or adaptable to changes in the environment as either the threats or the nodes. While the
nodes and threats react to the presence of other agents, the assets however do not react to
any other agents’ presence than their own.
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The sensing for each asset is essentially ideal and omniscient, but it is utilized in a
limited fashion that their sensing abilities are explained through the mobility algorithms.
3.2 Asset Mobility Algorithms
Since the assets do not typically move based on the locations of other agents, the method
in which they move is more aptly described as a mobility algorithm. The mobility al-
gorithms all incorporate random movement except for the waypoints mobility algorithm,
whose express purpose is to use user specified movements. The assets have four other mo-
bility models that direct them around the environment in addition to the choice of being
stationary, or static. These algorithms are explained further in their respective sections.
3.2.1 Waypoints
The waypoints mobility model is designed to allow for the custom routing of assets for
specific scenarios. This mobility scenario may become more useful when an asset has to
perform a specific task involving a specific route. However the environment in which the
asset is moving is 2D with no terrain so the waypoints simply serve as custom paths.
The waypoints are loaded into the simulator via a waypoint configuration file. In this
file each line contains ordered pairs which indicate an ordered list of waypoints that the
asset has to follow. Once an asset reaches the last waypoint it will stay at that location to
simulate reaching its destination.
3.2.2 Random Waypoints
This mobility model is similar to the waypoints mobility model, but instead of getting way-
points from a waypoint configuration file they are generated from the simulator’s Random
Number Generator (RNG). The RNG produces a random number, ϕ, such that (0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1),
so the number generated are scaled by the size of the environment in order to allow all areas
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of the environment as valid destinations for the assets employing this mobility algorithm.
3.2.3 Random Direction
The random direction mobility model was developed in an attempt to produce a more
“smooth” mobility model for the assets in which it could be determined whether frequent
direction changes affects asset protection. In other mobility models the assets may behave
in a manner that appears jerky, consisting of frequent direction changes. The Random
Direction mobility model will cause the asset to continue along its heading until the asset
reaches one of the boundaries of the environment and then calculate a new random direction
that will lead it back into the environment.
To this end, the random direction model works in the following manner:
1. At the beginning of the simulation choose a random direction to travel in, [0, 2π].
2. Once at the edge of the environment, choose a new direction that will point within
the field of the environment.
3. Repeat until the end of the simulation.
3.2.4 Random Time and Direction
Known as the “Random Mobility Model” in wireless networks [14] this mobility model is
a variation on the random direction model in which the duration for which the asset moves
along a random direction is limited by a time or distance parameter that is determined by
the RNG through the simulator.
As in the random direction mobility model, the algorithm starts out by choosing a ran-
dom direction, but it generates a coordinate by calculating where it would end if it followed
that direction for a random amount of time. Should the asset reach the bounds of the sim-
ulator it will “bounce” off the boundaries of the environment as in the random direction
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model. Otherwise the asset will continue until it reaches the calculated coordinate and then
choose a new random direction and duration in which to travel.
3.2.5 Collision Avoidance
While the assets are the least “intelligent” agents in the asset protection scenario, it stands
to reason that they will be intelligent enough to avoid collisions. Some form of collision
avoidance is present in each mobility algorithm, even if the collision avoidance solution is
to not move any closer to the object the asset is about to collide with.
Collision avoidance for assets only applies to other possible collisions with other assets.
Collisions with threats are typically unavoidable if the threat has already breached the asset
protection formation as the asset typically moves slower than the threats. Collisions with
nodes should be avoided in the node’s algorithm. Again, the assets aren’t meant to be very
intelligent agents as the idea is let the assets do what they need to in order to accomplish
their task and protect them from threats.
If an asset gets too close to another asset where the assets are ddaa or closer to each
other, the asset’s collision avoidance routine is triggered.
If the asset is using the waypoint or random waypoint mobility algorithm then the colli-
sion avoidance algorithm discards the current waypoint and uses the next waypoint. While
this might be problematic in an environment where the waypoint mobility algorithm is
used, and the waypoints have to be followed exactly (i.e. navigating a canyon floor, pass-
ing over a bridge). Another problem that may arise is that the waypoint mobility model
may run out of waypoints before the collision avoidance routine successfully avoids the
collision, whereas with the random waypoint mobility algorithm the list of waypoints is
infinite.
When the random direction or random time and direction mobility algorithms are used
the collision avoidance algorithms are a little more intelligent. A virtual wall is set up
between the two assets that are within ddaa of each other and the assets use that wall to
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head directly away from each other, mitigating the collision. This works naturally into the
already existing random direction and random time and direction algorithms.
3.2.6 Asset Intelligence
In an effort to make the assets less likely to choose a direction that would lead them into
dangerous situations an asset intelligence module was developed in order to augment the
random direction and random time and direction mobility models. When using asset in-
telligence the asset finds the largest gap in the field of threats, and then chooses a random
direction within that gap.
Using this module the assets are more likely to avoid being compromised by heading in
the safest direction available to the asset, given its current position and the distribution of
threats.
3.3 Threat Capabilities
The threats, unlike the assets are considerably more “intelligent” based on their enhanced
ability to react to agents in the environment. Threats employ APFs in order to quickly make
changes in their navigation to help them get to the assets while avoiding nodes.
Threats have omniscient and ideal sensors so that they can head towards the asset(s)
from any point in the environment and act accordingly.
3.4 Threat Intelligence
Threats differ from assets primarily in the level of intelligence they exhibit. By using APFs
for the threat’s path planning the asset protection algorithm is tested completely as the use
of APFs will make the threats search for holes in the nodes’ protection of the asset.
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Figure 3.1: Pat, the potential field assets exert on threats
3.4.1 Potential Assets exert on Threats
The primary drive of the threat’s path planning algorithm is to attract the threats to the
assets. This is done with a purely attractive APF. This APF linearly increases with regard
to distance from the asset (3.1), creating a radial APF as seen in Figure 3.1.
Pat(dat) = αatdat (3.1)
Threats therefore experience constant force towards the asset so that even in close prox-
imity to the asset, the threat is equally “determined” to get to the asset.
However, having multiple assets in the environment may end up in the threat being
trapped in a local minima between the assets. In order to counter this the threats employ
a method called Single Asset Consideration (SAC). When the threats use SAC to deter-
mine their asset forces, only the closest asset’s potential field is evaluated. Throughout the
course of the simulation the closest asset may change and in each case the closest asset is
recalculated in order to give the threat the greatest chance of compromising an asset. By
only considering one asset at a time the threats escape local minima from multiple assets.
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Figure 3.2: Pnt, the potential field nodes exert on threats
3.4.2 Potential Nodes exert on Threats
For assets to be protected from threats by nodes, threats must be repelled by the nodes in
the environment. For this purpose the nodes exert a purely repulsive APF against the threats
as seen in (3.2) and Figure 3.2.
Pnt(dnt) =
 ηrt(dnt − ddnt)2 , dnt < ddnt0 , ow (3.2)
The field is shaped so that the closer the threat gets to the node, the greater the force
acting against it will be. The relatively small force near the outside of the field’s reach is
small enough that it facilitates threats navigating around the node(s).
Higher intelligence features of threats, such as strategizing an attack on an asset by
cooperation and coordination of multiple threats may not be possible using a potential field
based navigation and path planning system. Many interesting “attack plans” may have
greater effect at reaching the asset, but they have not been employed in this version of
threat intelligence.
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Figure 3.3: Ptt, the potential field threats exert on threats.
3.4.3 Potential Threats exert on Threats
If the threats are modeled to be objects that occupy space, it stands to reason that they do
not want to collide with each other. For this purpose Ptt was designed.
Ptt(dtt) =
 τrt(dtt − ddtt)2 , dtt < ddtt0 , ow (3.3)
Ptt is a fully repulsive field which will repel threats away from other threats until the
desired minimum threat-threat distance, ddtt. This field will also seek to mitigate threat-
threat collisions as the repulsive force will increase as the threats get closer together.
3.5 Node Capabilities
The nodes have extremely similar capabilities to the other agents due to them being mod-
eled on physical robots. The nodes employ APFs in order to maneuver them into a protec-
tive formation around assets, avoid collisions, and at times react to threats.
Nodes most notably differ from the other agents in that they have a limited sensor range.
While the sensors are still ideal and omniscient, ignoring noise and line-of-sight problems
34
Figure 3.4: Adequate protection of an asset. Protection using fewer nodes may suffice for most
scenarios.
they can only detect objects within a limited range, making the node intelligence the most
realistically implementable on physical robots.
3.6 Node Intelligence (AeGIS)
The purpose of the AeGIS algorithm is, as mentioned earlier, to protect the assets from the
threats. The most obvious method of asset protection noting the repulsive effect that the
nodes have on the threats would be to interpose, or get between, the asset and the threat.
Additionally, success will largely be assured by the presence of a sufficient number of nodes
to complete the task as seen in Figure 3.4. However, if this is not possible, other approaches
will need to be considered, and follow as variations on the basic AeGIS algorithm.
3.6.1 Basic Algorithm
Before threats are present in the environment the location of the threats, or where they
will appear cannot be known. Additionally throughout the course of the simulation the
asset may move, or be surrounded by threats. For this reason it is desired for the nodes to
surround the asset in order to protect it. Using QAPFs, a field can be designed to create a


































Figure 3.5: The AeGIS Algorithm Flowchart, including the decision making structure on the forces
to calculate based on algorithm used.
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Figure 3.6: Pan, the potential field assets exert on nodes
Pan(dr) =
 αrn(dr − ddrn)2 , dr < ddrnαan(dr − ddrn)2 , ow (3.4)
Using Pan, the nodes will be attracted to the desired distance, ddrn, away from the asset,
utilizing an attractive force pulling nodes towards it, and repulsive forces pushing the nodes
away from it. Pan itself will not spread the nodes near it into a uniform formation around it,
which would have all the nodes equally spaced while remaining ddrn away from the asset.
For this the intra-nodal potential field, Pnn is introduced.
Pnn(dnn) =
 ηrn(dnn − ddnn)2 , dnn < ddnn0 , ow (3.5)
Pnn is a fully repulsive field which will repel other nodes until the desired minimum
node-node distance, ddnn. This field will also seek to mitigate node-node collisions as
the repulsive force will increase as the nodes get closer together. ddnn should be greater
than the desired node-node distance when in formation so the nodes will be forced into
equilibrium, with equal node-node forces on either side. In this manner, if a node leaves















Figure 3.7: 3D Plot of Pan








Figure 3.8: Pnn, the potential field nodes exert on nodes
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Figure 3.9: Insufficient protection for an asset that allows multiple access points for a threat to
compromise protection
The result of these two fields yields the necessary node intelligence for the nodes to
enter formation around the asset in order to protect it from threats, given that the number
of nodes in formation is sufficient to repel the threats(s).
Noting the equations for Pan and Pnt, the fields that put the nodes into formation around
the asset, and after making assumptions about the formation of the nodes around the asset,
the coefficient for Pnt can be made to repel threats in terms of the αat coefficient in Pat as
described in Appendix A.
When there are only a few nodes in formation around the asset the formation naturally
suffers from large gaps in protection due to physical distance between nodes in formation
as seen in Figure 3.9.
3.6.2 Potential Threats exert on Nodes
With flaws in formation as seen in Figure 3.9, if the nodes pay no heed to the threats then
there may remain large gaps for the threats to simply “walk in” and compromise the asset.
Upon this observation a field that the threats influence on the nodes, Ptn, was developed
which somewhat unintuitively attracts the nodes to threats. Ptn was engineered such that
the nodes would not be pulled significantly away from the asset, though it would steer the
nodes towards the side of the asset from which a threat was sensed. As with all the other
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Figure 3.10: Ptn, the potential field threats exert on nodes
fields, Ptn has a repulsive component to ensure collision avoidance. Ptn is designed to
bring the node’s repulsive force against the threats into play against the encroaching threats
when they otherwise would go unutilized.
Ptn(dnn) =
 τrn(dtn − ddtn)2 , dtn < ddtnτan(dtn − ddtn)2 , ow (3.6)
This attractive force from the threat on the nodes has some notable advantages and
disadvantages. As stated before, it can shift the nodes from one side of the asset (that does
not currently need protection) to a side that the threat is approaching from as seen in Figure
3.11. It can also draw nodes from an area of the environment that has not sensed any assets
to protect, and pull them towards an asset at which point the node can contribute to asset
protection. In other cases however, it can weaken a formation that is already sufficient to
block threats from reaching the asset by using the node’s Pnn repulsive forces against the
nodes in formation by opening a hole in the protection that allows the threat to slip in a
compromise the asset.
When multiple threats attack a single asset, when the nodes employ Ptn the nodes sur-
rounding the asset may be pulled to one side by a strong threat force, allowing the asset to
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Figure 3.11: Ptn successfully stopping a threat from compromising the asset from Figure 3.9
(a) (b)
Figure 3.12: Ptn causes the newly arriving nodes to see the asset as seen in Figure 3.12a, and their
proximity to nodes in formation causes the nodes to create an opening in asset protection that the
threat can reach the asset seen in Figure 3.12b
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Figure 3.13: Nodes including Ptn in their calculations are drawn to the stronger threat force on one
side of the asset, exposing the asset to being compromised by a single threat.
Figure 3.14: Overhead view of the local minima problem caused by two assets in close proximity
be compromised by smaller threat forces on the exposed side of the asset as seen in Figure
3.13.
Additionally, multiple assets can create a problem of a minima between the two (or
more) assets resulting in poor formation for all assets involved.
3.6.3 Spring Laws
In an effort to compensate for these weaknesses in protection another form of formation
control was explored utilizing spring laws. Spring laws have been used in distributed flock-
ing scenarios [11] to control the current agent’s position relative to its neighbors. In the
application of spring laws the potential field forces are replaced by Hooke’s spring restora-
tion force laws, in this case with a subset of the sensed agents seen in Figure 3.16.
By only considering a single asset for the duration of the simulation the node is guaran-

















Figure 3.15: Potential Field for 2 assets separated by 2 meters
Figure 3.16: The formation of spring laws used to test the effectiveness of spring laws
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by being the first asset that the node can see; if more than one it will choose the closest
one. This asset remains the only asset the node will consider in its asset potential field
calculations for the duration of the simulation.
Additionally, when using the spring forces, the node chooses two nodes to consider
as its neighbors. This is similar to the approach used by Ransom [10] in his use of the
Mid-Angle Formation Algorithm (MAFA) which utilized a wireless network in order to
communicate threat containment and which nodes were its left and right neighbors. In this
work the selection of neighbors and assets are attempted to be done without communica-
tion.
The node selects its neighbors by finding the left and right neighbors (if they exist) rel-
ative to its position in relation to the asset. These neighbors ideally would not vary through
the course of the simulation, resulting in a stable formation, but numerous problems result.
Not all nodes arrive in formation at the same time, thus the “late arrivals” may choose cor-
rect left and right neighbors, but their neighbors would have already established left and
right neighbors and not consider the late arrival in its force calculations.
On that same issue, only considering three agents in its force calculations remove the
general collision avoidance forces that were previously present in the asset protection algo-
rithm, causing nodes of different assets to collide if their paths coincided with each other.
Removing the requirement to lock in left and right neighbors results in better performance,
but it appears to be merely a limited form of the original collision avoidance and spreading
field, Pnn.
Taking the positive effects observed in the use of spring forces led to the Single Asset
Consideration (SAC) component of the algorithm, where each node would lock in to the
first and closest asset it sees, but retain its original Pnn forces.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.17: A depiction of how late arrivals in a scenario where neighbors are locked in tends to
be defective. In Figure 3.17a three nodes are already in formation around an asset with blue lines
depicting mutual spring laws and another node approaches the formation. When the node reaches
the formation as in Figure 3.17b, the “late arrival” node has established spring laws of its own with
its neighbors. However since the nodes already in formation do not readjust for this and thus have
no desire to move away from the late arrival resulting in an uneven formation
3.6.4 Adaptive Algorithm
The adaptive algorithm attempts to blend the strengths of both the basic algorithm when the
asset is surrounded by sufficient nodes and the Ftn (the force generated by Ptn) algorithm
as described in Section 3.6.2 when only a few nodes are surrounding the asset.
When using the Ftn algorithm with formations that had a sufficient number of nodes,
the Ftn force exerted on the nodes tends to shift all of the nodes to the side of the asset that
the strongest Ftn force was on, leaving areas of the asset exposed to being compromised.
In simulations with multiple threats this appeared to happen more often as they would be
attracted to areas of the formation with little protection as seen in Figure 3.13.
In order to blend the effectiveness of Ftn when the formation consisted of few nodes,
resulting insufficient protection as seen in Figure 3.9, and the strong protection offered by
the basic algorithm when a sufficient number of nodes are present, the adaptive algorithm
uses a set threshold for the number of nodes in formation in order to determine when to use
either algorithm.
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Each node before calculating Ftn calculates the number of nodes in formation around
the asset it is in formation around by measuring the Euclidian distance from the asset to
each node it can sense. If the number of nodes in formation is below the threshold the
node uses the Ftn forces as they would be normally calculated. Otherwise, if the number
of nodes sensed in formation is greater or equal to the threshold, it ignores the Ftn forces




The Leviathan simulator is an event driven simulator for distributed control algorithms
over multiple groups of agents. Leviathan is based largely off of MAHESHDAS which
was originally developed by Bushan Mehendale [8]. The Leviathan core primarily consists
of three components, reading environment variable and constraints, initializing the envi-
ronment and running the simulation. These components will be explained in detail in the
following sections.
4.1 Variable Input
There are many environment variables that the simulator allows to be set fairly dynamically.
Variables such as environment size, the time to simulate, and several algorithm specific
variables can be set through configuration files supplied to the simulator. Other variables
can be passed in through command line arguments, these are usually variables more specific
to the simulation being run, such as the number of agents and their variable capabilities.
Command line arguments are passed in as either a Boolean flag, or a paired flag and
parameter set. A full list of the present command line arguments follow in Table 4.1.
The configuration files are used to store variables less often changed through a sweep of
simulations in order to avoid cluttering the command line, while retaining variables for the
simulator. The simulator uses a configuration file parser that reads in every parameter from
multiple configuration files and stores them in a table during initialization of the simulator
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Table 4.1: Table of Command Line Arguments for use in the Leviathan Simulator
Argument Meaning
-r long Use the next argument as a seed for the simulator’s random number generator
-gui If present, use the GUI to display the simulation
-n int Use the next argument to specify the number of nodes in the simulation
-pn If present, place the nodes near the creation site of the assets
-ftn If present, use Ftn in the node algorithm
-an If present, use the adaptive algorithm for the nodes. Overrides the presence of -ftn
-t int Use the next argument to specify the number of threats in the simulation
-mt If present, allow the threats to be mobile
-a int Use the next argument to specify the number of assets in the simulation
-am String If present, use the next argument to specify the asset’s mobility model
-ia If present, allow the assets to choose their direction intelligently





rtd Random Time and Direction
for lookup throughout the span of the simulation.
4.2 Initialization
Initialization of the simulator involves taking all of the variable inputs, such as command
line arguments and variables from the configuration files and constructing the scenario for
simulation as it would appear at the beginning of the simulation.
The simulator first initializes the request framework which consists of a collection of
requests filed by the agents in the simulation with an execution time and request to be
satisfied. The request framework will be explained in detail in Section 4.3.
In order to create a “live” simulation, the agents must be seeded with their first actions
so that when the simulation starts the agent will be included in the request framework.





















Figure 4.1: Flowchart depicting simulator lifespan
49
The nodes exist at the beginning of the simulation, so they are simply placed within the
environment, but have a random “on” time, which will give them an offset as to when their
requests are filed. Generating random “on times” is an attempt to make an asynchronous
system that could accurately represent a physical system of mobile robots. The start po-
sition of nodes is by default randomly within a node “creation zone” which encompasses
the zone in which assets can be created. The nodes can be placed even closer to the assets
by examining the starting location of each of the assets, and then placing nodes randomly
within a radius of that location. In the case of multiple assets, nodes are placed by cycling
through the assets and placing one node at each asset until the number of nodes in the sim-
ulation has been reached. This approach for placing nodes is called “node placement” as
opposed to randomly placing nodes.
The assets and threats however are not present at the onset of the simulation, and their
initial request is a creation request, which will create them at a specified position in the
environment at a specified time.
The assets are created within the asset creation zone which is a region within the envi-
ronment to facilitate the idea of the assets already being in a common location at the onset
of the mission. This asset creation zone is defined by minimum and maximum x and y
parameters to which the assets can be placed randomly.
Similarly, the threats are created in the threat creation zone which exists outside of the
asset creation zone. This creation zone ensures that the threats cannot be placed within
an asset protection formation, and reduces the likelihood that threats will be able to get
to the assets before equilibrium is established between its protecting nodes. Like the as-
set creation zone, the threat creation zone is defined by minimum and maximum x and y
parameters in the environment’s configuration file.
The assets are created at a time using an offset, σα, to determine the earliest possible
time an asset can be created. A random number, ϕ, is generated such that 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 and
scaled by the asset creation spread ϵα in order to create the assets within a period of time
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Figure 4.2: The three zones of which agents can be created in
after the offset, as seen in (4.1). Likewise, the threats are created at a time specified by
(4.2).
tαc = σα + ϵα · ϕ (4.1)
tτc = στ + ϵτ · ϕ (4.2)
Once all the agents have their initial positions and requests initialized through one man-
ner or another the simulator’s logger is initialized. The logger is a component that will keep
track of metrics important to the implementer throughout the simulation, and is further de-
fined in a later section (Section 4.4).
At this point the simulator is fully initialized and ready to be run.
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Run Simulator
Find the first Request
to be executed
Advance simulator time













Figure 4.3: The process the simulator goes through during its course of execution
4.3 Running the Simulation/Request Framework
Running the simulation is largely a function of the state of the request framework after
initialization. The basic mechanics of running the simulation consist of finding the first
request to be executed, advancing the simulator time to that time, executing that request
and repeating. A flowchart depicting this process is shown in Figure 4.3.
Executing requests involves determining the owner of the request, and asking it to exe-
cute the request. This is done in order to simplify the role of the environment to the point
that it is an entity to schedule agent actions and collect and disseminate information to and
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from the agents.
For instance, a movement request from a node is determined by what the node can
sense, and from that where it wants to go. This request is filed with the environment’s
request framework and when it is scheduled to be executed the environment tells the node
to execute its move. The node’s move is governed by its locomotion module which limits
the move to what is physically possible within the given time. Were this left up to the
environment it would need to have a library of all the node’s capabilities and then execute
its move for it.
Once a request has been executed the simulator will remove the request from the collec-
tion of requests, and get a new request from the agent, which will be executed at the proper
time. After each request the simulator ticks the logger, which will reevaluate all its metrics
with the new agent positions. This cycle of processing and receiving requests continues
until either the request collection is empty, or the specified time to simulate is reached, at
which point the simulation is over.
4.4 Logger
The logger is a utility utilized by the simulator that is updated after each iteration of the
simulator in order to keep track of various metrics during the simulation. The logger is
initialized with the collections of the agents in the environment and uses the information
stored in the agents to determine a variety of metrics after each iteration of the simulator.
Commonly the location of the agents are useful for detecting whether or not nodes are in
formation around an asset, or whether a threat has indeed compromised an asset.
Other metrics may be determined by customizing the logger to store whatever infor-
mation is needed to compute the desired metric. For instance, during the development of
the simulator and its incremental testing, it was noticed through the GUI that nodes were
occasionally jumping from their current location to their desired location instantaneously.
The logger was used in this instance to monitor the positions of the nodes from iteration
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to iteration to see if any of them were moving greater than their maximum linear velocity
allowed. Through this method a bug in the locomotion module was discovered where a
calculation was returning “Not a Number”, or NaN, instead of a valid angle, which caused
downstream errors in the calculation of how far the agent could move in the allowed time.
However, the main purpose of the logger is to calculate and maintain the metric per-
taining to success rate. And for the ease of reporting results and avoiding a constant stream
of simulator information throughout the simulation the logger contains a method that will
print out the final metrics at the end of the simulation.
4.5 Components
There are several components that make the simulator modular and versatile. Three of
these components that contribute to simulating real life components within the simulator
are the robot’s battery, sensors and locomotion module. These components are explained
in the sections that follow.
4.5.1 Battery Model
Each robot in the simulation has a battery as its counterpart in the experimental world
would. The battery is modeled using a simple first generation linear model just as the
battery module that MAHESHDAS utilizes [8]. The model assumes the battery to have
a limited capacity that is drained by the other components that the robot uses such as the
sensors or locomotion module. The battery is drained by the components by extracting a
current i in mA over a duration of t seconds. Using these parameters the battery is drained
by i·t
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mAh. The voltage is held constant as long as the battery contains energy. Upon the
depletion of the energy in the battery the battery returns false values for each drain request.
When a robot gets a false value on a drain call, the robot cannot complete the given
task, and either is rendered “blind” or “dead”, unable to sense or move, respectively.
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4.5.2 Sensor Model
The sensor module consists of a collection of ideal sensors mounted around the circum-
ference of the robots with ideal sensor fusion and instant recognition of what the object is
(asset, node, threat, etc.). Like the battery module the sensor module is modeled after the
one used in the MAHESHDAS simulator, although the option of sensor noise has not been
included in this model.
Agents that use the sensor module will drain their batteries every time they attempt to
sense their surroundings and have a limited sensing range.
4.5.3 Locomotion Model
The locomotion module is based on a simple two-wheeled differential drive model utilizing
stepper motors. The locomotion module utilizes these motors in order to determine how far
the robot can get to a desired location through two simple behaviors, rotating and moving
linearly.
The motors are capable of either forward or reverse operation, and rotation from [0, 2π].
The locomotion module uses both motors for each operation, rotational and linear move-
ment, and the speed at which they are allowed to move is determined by the type of agent
using it, and their corresponding settings in the simulator’s configuration file. The process
at which the locomotion module determines the amount a robot can move in a given time
follows in Figure 4.4.
The locomotion module, like other modules, draws power from the battery when ac-
tivated. If the locomotion module is unable to draw current from the battery then the





































Figure 4.4: The process that the Locomotion Module follows to determine how far a robot can move
in a given time
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4.6 Graphical User Interface (GUI)
The GUI provides clear, easy to interpret information on the agents’ locations which is
essential to grasping the performance of the algorithm and determining where its strengths
and shortcomings occur.
The GUI is the same one as used in Mehendale’s MAHESHDAS and has been modified
slightly to accommodate the additional agents and agent capabilities included since the
inception of MAHESHDAS. The GUI now displays assets, nodes and threats as differently
colored dots in the simulator, and shows the direction each of the nodes are facing. A
screenshot of the GUI is seen in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: A screenshot of the GUI mid-simulation. 20 threats appear as red dots, six nodes as blue
dots and a single asset as a green dot.
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Chapter 5
Simulation Results and Discussion
As seen in the earlier chapters and sections, there are many parameters that can be set
to different values that will drastically alter the scenario being simulated. These param-
eters run the gamut from physical and environmental to algorithmic parameters and APF
coefficients. The values chosen for these parameters by default and from simulation to
simulation will be discussed in this chapter along with the settings, results and discussion
for each simulation.
5.1 Simulation Setup
5.1.1 Physical and Environment Parameters
As the simulator is meant to simulate near real life conditions to test the performance of
the algorithm, the physical and environmental parameters of the simulator were chosen in
order to closely simulate real life conditions and components, leaving the algorithm and
algorithm’s parameters to accommodate for the conditions they might encounter in actual
implementation.
Most of the physical parameters of the agents were inherited from the MAHESHDAS
simulator [8], making the same assumptions about motor speed and efficiency, sensor ac-
curacy and range, battery capacity and behavior. Threats were given the same locomotive
capabilities as the nodes in order to make them a comparable opponent to asset protection,
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Table 5.1: Physical Parameters of Agents in the Simulator
Parameter Default Value
Asset/Node/Threat Radius 0.05m
Asset Maximum Angular Velocity π/2 rad/s
Asset Maximum Velocity 0.05m/s
Node Maximum Angular Velocity π rad/s
Node Maximum Velocity 0.1m/s
Threat Maximum Angular Velocity π rad/s
Threat Maximum Velocity 0.1m/s
Battery Capacity 3000 mAh
Single Motor Current Consumption 0.25 A
Node Sensor Current Consumption 5 mA
Node Sensing Time 10ms
Node Sensing Range 3m
while the asset speeds were halved under the assumption that nodes would be designed to
easily keep up with assets.
Environment variables were chosen such that the size and conditions of the field would
simulate the scenario of assets being marked in one region of the field, and threats ap-
proaching the assets from another, separate area. In order to give the assets enough room
to exercise their mobility algorithms the environment is made to be somewhat large taking
the dimensions seen in Table 5.2.
The variables concerning the minimum and maximum x and y values for asset creation
concern the creation zone for the asset as shown in Figure 4.2. The node creation minimum
and maximum x and y values correspond to the node creation zone, which is designed to
fully encompass the asset creation zone to ensure that an asset can only be created in an
area that nodes will be present. The threat creation zone only contains one parameter, the
minimum x value which is used to create threats abiding by one criteria, that threats are not
created in the asset creation zone.
The minimum asset creation distance is set to a distance that will help ensure that assets
aren’t created near each other. When this occurs, there is a chance that nodes created near
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Table 5.2: Environmental Parameters of the Simulator
Parameter Default Value
Environment X Dimension 20m
Environment Y Dimension 20m
Asset Minimum X 1m
Asset Maximum X 3m
Asset Minimum Y 1m
Asset Maximum Y 15m
Threat Minimum X Asset Maximum X (3m)
Node Minimum X 0m
Node Maximum X 4m
Node Minimum Y 0m
Node Maximum Y 16m
Minimum Asset-Asset Distance 3m
Maximum Node-Asset Placement Distance 1.5m
Time to Simulate 500s
Asset Creation Offset (σα) 10s
Asset Creation Spread (ϵα) 5s
Threat Creation Offset (στ ) 20s
Threat Creation Spread (ϵτ ) 3s
the assets will have to choose between the two assets, possibly resulting in a dispropor-
tionate distribution of nodes between the assets. To further guard against this, when node
placement is used the Node-Asset Placement distance ensures that nodes placed next to
their “assigned” asset have no closer asset than their “assigned” one, and with Single Asset
Consideration (SAC) this proximity assures asset loyalty among the nodes.
The final variables used in the environmental settings are those corresponding the asset
and threat creation times.
5.1.2 Algorithmic Parameters
The values in Table 5.3 show the determined algorithmic values of the potential field co-
efficients and the desired distances that center each potential field. These values were
either assigned, calculated through simulation or calculated given assumptions on the asset
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Minimum Nodes in Formation 4
protection formation. αat was the first value chosen as it was assigned, after which, as-
sumptions were made about the formation given experimental values of αrn and αan, and
constraints on the values of the rest of the coefficients were calculated. τrn and τan were
determined experimentally in order to accurately “dial-in” the Ftn behavior. For a detailed
explanation of how the values for αat and ηrt were chosen see Appendix A.
Agent δt specifies the frequency at which the robots can “sense and think” before mak-
ing a new action. This is derived from the time it is conservatively estimated for the robot
to sense and receive sensor data, interpret the results, run the algorithm and plan a new
movement. As far as the simulator is concerned, the simulator asks the agent for a new
movement request every Agent δt.
Minimum nodes in formation is a value used by the adaptive algorithm to set the min-
imum number of nodes in a formation before switching between using Ftn and the basic
algorithm.
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5.2 Evaluation of Asset Protection Success
Asset protection success is determined by the absence of an asset being compromised. The
logger keeps a record of each asset during of the simulation, and each simulation “tick”
the logger checks to see if any threats are closer than the closest node to the asset. Given
that the threats have the same speed as the nodes, if any threat is closer to the asset than
the closest node, the asset will be compromised before the nodes in formation, or near the
asset can do anything to prevent it.
5.3 Simulation Results
The following results attempt to show the success of the AeGIS algorithm under different
parameters. Throughout the simulations, various parameters will be adjusted in order to
test the effectiveness of the AeGIS algorithm. The parameters for the APF coefficients
will not be varied over any of the simulations in order to accurately portray the algorithmic
responses of the agents.
5.3.1 Basic Algorithm Success versus Number of Threats
Figure 5.1 shows how success of the basic variation of AeGIS (Section 3.6.1) on a sin-
gle static asset varies given the number of nodes in formation and the number of threats
attempting to breach the formation. The number of nodes was varied from 1 to 6 and the
number of threats was varied from 1 to 20. The success rate reflects the percentage of assets
that were protected as defined in Section 5.2.
As seen in Figure 5.1, basic AeGIS yields low success rates for few nodes in formation.
As the number of nodes in formation increases the basic AeGIS algorithm is able to provide
higher success rates, protecting the asset against single and eventually multiple threats.
When the formation of nodes consists of five or six nodes the algorithm appears to be


























1 Node 2 Nodes 3 Nodes 4 Nodes 5 Nodes 6 Nodes
Figure 5.1: Success rate of the basic asset protection algorithm for a static asset while varying nodes
in formation and threats present in the environment. A single asset was created in the environment
with the given number of nodes being created within 1.5m of the asset. Simulation length was 500s.
to breach the formation. Six nodes appear to be highly successful, their success rate never
falling below 98%.
From these observations we can determine sufficient protection using basic AeGIS on a
single static asset will consist of using five or six nodes. In applications with a high number
of threats, five nodes will suffer a lower success rate.
In cases of a single mobile asset the basic AeGIS algorithm performs similar to a single
static asset. Figure 5.2 shows a single mobile asset employing the random direction mobil-
ity model while varying the number of nodes from 1 to 6, and the number of threats from 1
to 20.
As with the single static asset, basic AeGIS yields low success rates for simulations
with few nodes in formation as the success rate is under 10%. The more desired formation



























1 Nodes 2 Nodes 3 Nodes 4 Nodes 5 Nodes 6 Nodes
Figure 5.2: Success rate of the basic asset protection algorithm for a mobile asset employing the
random direction mobility model while varying nodes in formation and threats present in the en-
vironment. A single asset was created in the environment with the given number of nodes being


























1 Node 2 Nodes 3 Nodes 4 Nodes 5 Nodes 6 Nodes
Figure 5.3: Success rate of the basic asset protection algorithm for a mobile asset employing the
intelligent random direction mobility model while varying nodes in formation and threats present
in the environment. A single asset was created in the environment with the given number of nodes
being created within 1.5m of the asset. Simulation length was 500s.
However, these purely random movements may cause the asset to head into dangerous
situations, so the same simulation was run again using the intelligent random direction
algorithm.
Figure 5.3 shows the results of the simulations with the intelligent random direction
algorithm. As shown in Figure 5.3 versus Figure 5.2, the performance of the basic AeGIS
algorithm improves when the asset uses a mobility algorithm designed to avoid threats.
As seen with the static asset in Figure 5.1 the success rate for an intelligent mobile asset
is comparable to the static asset’s success rate. However, with sufficient threats they may
envelop the asset with such a density that there is no “safe” direction to travel in as shown


























1 Node 2 Nodes 3 Nodes 4 Nodes 5 Nodes 6 Nodes
Figure 5.4: Success rate of mobile assets while varying nodes in formation and threats present
in the environment. The data is collected as the average of all the mobile algorithms to show
comprehensive results for all mobilities.
5.3.2 Consistency of Mobility Models
With four different mobility models for the asset to employ it’s possible that one mobility
model would give different results than another mobility model, or that each mobility model
may yield significantly different results. For this reason the same set of simulations were
run with each of the different mobility models.
The results of these simulations were interpreted two different ways. The first was to
analyze how movement affected asset protection in general. The results of the four mobility
models were collated and the total success rate was calculated. These results can be seen
in Figure 5.4.
The results in Figure 5.4 are similar to the figure showing how the random direction
model affects the basic AeGIS algorithm. These simulations were run varying the nodes
from 1-6 and the threats from 1-10 while placing the nodes no greater than 1.5m away








































































































1 Node 2 Nodes 3 Nodes 4 Nodes 5 Nodes 6 Nodes
(d) Random Time and Direction
Figure 5.5: A depiction of how different mobility models the asset can employ effect the AeGIS
algorithm.
The total simulations for each node and threat combination were summed along the failed
simulations for each node and threat combination. The success rate for each combination
was then calculated.
The second way these results were analyzed were to see how the success varied between
different mobility models. Figure 5.5 shows each of the mobility algorithm’s results for the
same simulation parameters as described for Figure 5.4.


























1 Asset 2 Assets 3 Assets 4 Assets 5 Assets
Figure 5.6: Success rate of basic AeGIS over static assets while varying number of assets in the
environment and the number of nodes in formation. Assets were created within the environment a
minimum of 2m apart and nodes were placed within 1m of their respective asset.
each individual mobility algorithm were calculated. Each one of the mobility models dif-
fered by less than 1% of their values except for a single point in the Waypoint mobility
model which differed by 1.06%.
5.3.3 Basic Algorithm Success over Multiple Assets
Multiple assets pose a scenario that has not been possible in the earlier simulations. With
multiple assets the nodes have more than one resource they need to protect from threats.
Additionally, the threats may attack different assets, seeking to take advantage of a ne-
glected asset, or focus their attacks all on one asset. In Figure 5.6 the effect of multiple
assets and the number of nodes in formation on the success rate of the basic algorithm is
shown.
As seen in Figure 5.6 it would appear that with a sufficient number of nodes in formation



















































1 Asset 2 Assets 3 Assets 4 Assets 5 Assets
Figure 5.7: Success rate of basic AeGIS over mobile assets employing the random direction mobility
model while varying number of assets in the environment and the number of nodes in formation.
Assets were created within the environment a minimum of 2m apart and nodes were placed within
1m of their respective asset.
algorithm in a single static asset. As the number of assets in the simulation increase, the
success rate of assets with few nodes in formation increases, while the success rate of assets
with a sufficient number of nodes in formation decreases.
With multiple mobile assets it is possible that the assets may pass closely to each other,
or in the absence of collision avoidance, collide. In this case the nodes of one asset’s
protection formation may interfere with the nodes assigned to another asset and cause a
disruption in formation that may allow threats to compromise the assets. The effect of
multiple mobile assets is shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7 shows that as in Figure 5.6 with multiple static assets, as the number of
assets increases, the success rate for assets with few nodes in formation increases, while
the success rate for assets with sufficient nodes in formation decreases.




















































Number of Nodes Given to each Asset
Figure 5.8: Average number of nodes received versus the number of nodes given to each asset for
static assets. Error bars reflect one standard deviation.
protected by the number of nodes that were intended. The AeGIS algorithm will lock into
a single asset in order to assure asset loyalty. However, due to the random creation times
of assets nodes may lock into an asset that it wasn’t intended to. In order to determine the
extent of this problem, the distribution of nodes was examined as seen in Figure 5.8 for
static assets and Figure 5.9 for the mobile assets.
The assets, on average, receive the intended number of nodes due to the simulation setup
to give each asset an equal number of nodes. The variance in the number of nodes received
is shown by the error bars which represent one standard deviation from the average. The
number of nodes varies widely as the desired number of nodes increases. The standard
deviation and percentage of assets with sufficient protection are shown in Tables 5.4 and
5.5.
From Tables 5.4 and 5.5 it is shown that the effect of creating assets at random times in
a field of already present assets widely affects both the number of nodes in formation and




















































Number of Nodes Given to each Asset
Figure 5.9: Average number of nodes received versus the number of nodes given to each asset for
multiple assets employing the random direction mobility model. Error bars reflect one standard
deviation.
Table 5.4: Node placement success for multiple static assets
Nodes Assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6
Std. Dev. of Actual 0.698 1.281 1.838 2.399 2.965 3.455
Assets with 6+ nodes 0% 0.91% 11.08% 22.58% 30.75% 67.06%
Table 5.5: Node placement success for multiple assets using the random direction mobility algo-
rithm
Nodes Assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6
Std. Dev. of Actual 0.695 1.291 1.867 2.473 3.002 3.527


























1 Asset 2 Assets 3 Assets 4 Assets 5 Assets
Figure 5.10: Success rate of basic AeGIS over static assets employing the random direction mobility
model while varying number of assets in the environment and the number of nodes in formation.
Assets were created within the environment a minimum of 2m apart simultaneously and nodes were
placed within 1m of their respective asset.
5.5, even when only two nodes are supposed to protect each asset, nearly 1% of assets
receive adequate (six or more) nodes in formation. When this occurs, of the assets that are
given sufficient protection only 66% of them actually receive it.
The results from creating each asset at the same time by setting the spread parameter,
ϵα = 0 can be seen in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. The figures show that when the assets are
defined in the environment simultaneously, the formations employing six nodes have a very
high success rate.
5.3.4 Assets Compromised versus Simulation Time
Figure 5.12 shows the rate of assets being compromised over the length of the simulation
in instances where the nodes are not placed within proximity to the assets. Ten nodes


























1 Asset 2 Assets 3 Assets 4 Assets 5 Assets
Figure 5.11: Success rate of basic AeGIS over mobile assets employing the random direction mobil-
ity model while varying number of assets in the environment and the number of nodes in formation.
Assets were created within the environment a minimum of 2m apart simultaneously and nodes were






















































































































Figure 5.12: Assets not compromised over simulation time. 10 nodes were placed randomly within
the node creation zone and 3 threats were created within the threat creation zone. A single static
asset was created in order to show when assets become compromised during simulations.
creation zone. Three threats were created within the threat creation zone.
As seen in Figure 5.12 when using the Ftn AeGIS algorithm in an environment with
randomly placed nodes the end success rate is higher than when using the basic algorithm.
Examining Figure 5.13 offers an explanation.
Figure 5.13 shows that the number of nodes in formation around the asset by the end of
the simulation is on average more than that of the basic algorithm. Additionally the curve
of the nodes in formation when using Ftn closely resembles the curve of the average threat
presence over time, suggesting that the node’s Ftn forces bring additional nodes to the asset






















































































































Nodes in Formation (Basic)
Nodes in Formation (Ftn)
Threats
Figure 5.13: The presence of nodes in formation and the arrival rate of threats from the simulations
in Figure 5.12.
5.3.5 Assets Compromised versus Simulation Time using Adaptive AeGIS
In an effort to utilize the node gathering abilities shown by the Ftn algorithm, and the
protection offered by the basic algorithm when sufficient nodes are in formation the adap-
tive algorithm was tested in the same environment as Section 5.3.4. The results using the
random time and direction mobility model are seen in Figure 5.14.
Figure 5.14 shows that over the course of the simulation the adaptive algorithm protects
more assets that either the Ftn algorithm or the basic algorithm, though it retains qualities
of both. Two intervals of time are identified to be of interest as they correspond to the times
at which threat activity demonstrates two distinct behaviors. These regions are identified in
Figure 5.15.
The region of highest threat arrival rate is the period of time where threats are most
likely to immediately find gaps in the asset’s protective formation since these threats are























































































































Figure 5.14: Assets not compromised over simulation time. 10 nodes were placed randomly within
the node creation zone and 3 threats were created within the threat creation zone. A single asset
utilizing the random time and direction mobility model was created to show when moving assets
become compromised during simulations.
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Figure 5.15: Regions of interest in threat arrival overlaid on a plot of the average number of threats
at the asset versus time.
highest threat strength is the period of time where all the threats that are going to attempt
to compromise this asset are present. It’s in these two regions that the strengths of both the
Ftn and basic algorithm are seen.
Table 5.6: Percent of assets not compromised at chosen time and the rate at which assets become





Basic 88.0% 57.2% 18.48%/min
Ftn 92.1% 66.3% 15.48%/min
Adaptive 91.1% 66.8% 14.58%/min
Since Figure 5.14 shows the assets compromised as a function of time it follows that
the derivative with respect to time will yield the asset protection failure rate, or the rate
at which assets are compromised. Table 5.6 shows that in the time period where the most
threats are arriving the Ftn algorithm has a lower rate of asset compromise compared to
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the basic algorithm. This may be due to the behavior of Ftn causing the nodes to shift in
position around the asset to face the threats, or a result of the threats bringing additional
nodes to the asset protection formation, or a combination of the two.
Table 5.7: Percent of assets not compromised at chosen time and the rate at which assets become





Basic 46.4% 39.7% 1.675%/min
Ftn 54.0% 44.5% 2.375%/min
Adaptive 57.5% 52.4% 1.275%/min
In Table 5.7 the basic algorithm has a lower rate of asset compromise than algorithm
using Ftn. This can be attributed to the assumption that during this time period the vast
majority of nodes that are going to sense and join formation around the asset have done so
at this point. In such a condition the basic algorithm differs from Ftn in that it distributes
the nodes around the asset better than Ftn can. Additionally the Ftn force may compromise
assets as seen in Figure 3.13.
Examining the rate of asset compromise for the adaptive algorithm however reveals
that during the region of highest threat arrival the adaptive algorithm behaves more like Ftn
than the basic algorithm. However during the period of highest threat strength the adaptive
algorithm’s rate of asset compromise more closely resembles the basic algorithm than the
algorithm using Ftn. Additionally, during both of these periods the adaptive algorithm has
the lowest rate of asset compromise, possibly due to the Ftn forces bringing nodes to the
formation and the higher resulting number of nodes in formation.
5.3.6 Threat Behavior that Compromises Otherwise Well Protected Assets
The threats themselves displayed some unintended emergent behaviors that aided them in
the task of compromising assets through the simulations that merit mention.
One such threat behavior causes the compromise of initially well defended assets is the
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Figure 5.16: Emergent threat behavior, where the three threats shown push the inner threat through
the asset’s protective formation. Threats typically spread out around the protective formation prior
to layering.
actions of threats pushing each other though the protective node formation. This observed
behavior shows why a higher number of threats may breach a successful asset protection
formation, while a fewer number of threats could not. The threats, utilizing Ftt for colli-
sion avoidance and spreading behavior to find weaknesses in the formation, in a sufficient
number, layer around the asset and end up pushing the inner layer of threats through the
protective formation of nodes.
The threats demonstrate this behavior as a result of the strength of Fat compared to
Ftt. The threats closest to the asset are sufficiently repelled by the node formation, but
the additional force of the threats on the outer layers can result in the threat breaching
the protective formation. This behavior has not been seen when the protection formation
contains six nodes, as reflected in Figure 5.1, even with as many as 40 threats surrounding
the asset.
Another cause for threats to compromise otherwise well protected assets results from
their use of the locomotion module (Section 4.5.3). In simulations where the assets are
mobile a threat that has been prevented from compromising the asset the threat will remain
near the asset ready for any weakness that may arise in the protective formation. However,
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if the asset changes direction, and heads towards the threat, the threat may not have suffi-
cient time to rotate and move to stay outside of the protection formation. This condition is
often compounded with the presence of outer layers of threats preventing their movement
away from the protective formation.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
The main and only goal of asset protection is to prevent threats from reaching the assets.
In a hostile environment this is no simple task as the number, strength and location of
threats are unknown. Additionally, the circumstances under which the asset is in a hostile
environment may make its protection more difficult. Requiring the asset to perform a task
that will send it deeper into the hostile environment, requiring protection to be able to be
sustained for long periods of time.
Variations of the AeGIS algorithm accomplish asset protection behavior by using QAPFs
to maneuver the robots into a protective formation around the asset and successfully pre-
vent threats from compromising the asset by utilizing the repulsive force the robots exert
on the threats. Many works have accomplished this task by flooding the area with swarm
robots and using their numbers to defend the asset, however this work tackled the challenge
of using only a few robots to protect the asset.
As seen in the results (Section 5.3) the AeGIS algorithm and its variations proved to be
quite capable at protecting assets from vast numbers of threats. Given the location of the
asset and a sufficient number of robots, the basic AeGIS algorithm was able to hold off as
many as 20 threats in a static single asset scenario while maintaining a very high success
rate, and 20 threats in a mobile single asset scenario and 20 threats when utilizing the asset
intelligence module. While the AeGIS algorithm performed less successfully in mobile
cases than static cases, the performance did not vary widely from mobility algorithm to
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mobility algorithm, showing that the AeGIS algorithm is robust over multiple mobility
models.
However, from the simulation results it appears that the more assets there are in the en-
vironment, less successful the AeGIS algorithm is. Even with the robots evenly distributed
among the assets at the beginning of the scenario, the random arrival times of the assets
cause an uneven distribution of robots among assets. The effect of multiple assets in this
case causes some assets to survive uncompromised while the threats focus on other, less
protected assets.
When the starting locations of assets are not known and the robots are distributed ran-
domly the basic AeGIS algorithm often times is not successful enough on its own to protect
an asset from multiple threats. The use of Ftn in these cases can protect the asset in its abil-
ity to shift robots in formation around the asset, and its ability to attract stray nodes to the
asset by following threats. However in larger numbers Ftn tends to provide weak protection
as it will cluster the robots to the side of the asset that has the strongest threat presence.
The adaptive AeGIS algorithm however combines the attractive abilities of the Ftn al-
gorithm with the superior protection offered by a well equipped basic algorithm. Its ability
to switch from the Ftn algorithm to the basic algorithm based on the number of robots in
formation makes it a highly effective asset protection algorithm in a field of randomly dis-
tributed robots. Another particularly attractive feature of this algorithm is that robots not
in formation will exhibit the Ftn behavior, regardless of the number of robots in formation
around the asset, so even after the asset becomes “sufficiently protected” additional robots
may join the formation.
Adding to the value of this solution is that the AeGIS algorithm itself as programmed
is implementable on a physical robot with a low computational complexity. Referring to
Figure 3.5, the robot at most loops over the sensed agents twice in order to compute its
next move resulting in a complexity of O(ns) – O(2ns), where ns is the number of agents
sensed by the robot.
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However well the AeGIS algorithm performs, it has not been implemented in a physical
environment and several factors may affect the results and conclusions made about its per-
formance. The locomotion module contains no slippage. The sensors are ideal, ignoring
noise, line of sight and are able to immediately determine whether another agent is an asset,
threat or another robot. The battery uses a large capacity that does not consider any health
function of the battery itself, yielding in optimal performance. More accurate modeling of
these components will provide the most direct path to the implementation of the AeGIS
algorithm on mobile robots.
Aside from more accurate modeling of components there are several areas of research
that can follow this work. The 3D implementation of the AeGIS algorithm or the modi-
fication of the simulator to support terrain models are particularly interesting as it would
make the environment more representative of real life environments. The 3D implementa-
tion need not be limited to terrain as the implementation with changes to the locomotion
module can result in the application of the AeGIS algorithm to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) and result in applications such as unmanned escorts for aerial assets.
Bringing the AeGIS algorithm back to the ground, a variety of works would yield in-
teresting results. High level threat attack plans would challenge the robots and the AeGIS
algorithm more, and a damage model for the robots would most likely be required at this
point as damage can affect how the robots respond (if at all) to new high level attacks.
Additionally the assets may follow task models to simulate actual tasks the asset may per-
form, such as travel to a location to take a sensor reading, or place a remote sensor station.
One extremely interesting task may be the asset traveling to a location in order to repair a
disabled robot or asset, and then the AeGIS algorithm having to escort both the asset and
the repaired object back to a safe area. Finally, the robot workforce may need to become
heterogeneous, as it may be unrealistic to equip each robot with the features required to
repel all types of threats.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Choice Artificial Potential Field
Coefficients
A.1 General One Threat One Node Scenario
As seen in Figure A.1, the threats have two potential fields that control their movements.
Fat describes the force the asset exerts on the threat and Fnt describes the force each node
exerts on the threat. Fat is derived from Pat observed in Section 3.4, and the force derived




Pat(dat) = αat (A.1)
Fnt takes the form of a Quadratic Artificial Potential Field (QAPF) whose equation is
derived from Section 3.4 and follows as (A.8).
Figure A.1: General configuration of one node, one asset and one threat
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 2 · ηrt(dnt − ddnt) , dnt < ddnt0 , ow (A.2)
In order for one node to repel one threat, the two forces must completely cancel each
other out. Since there are only two forces to speak of, they must oppose each other, making
θn = 0. Then, in order to cancel out the two forces they must be equal and opposite. Since
they’re defined in opposite directions, they can be canceled out as in (A.3).
Fat < Fnt
αat < −2 · ηrt(dnt − ddnt)
− αat
2 · (dnt − ddnt)
< ηrt, dnt < ddnt (A.3)
(A.3) can be used to calculated the desired parameter that will allow one node to repel
one threat.
A.2 Two Nodes, One Threat Scenario
To establish protection of the asset with two nodes, it should stand that initially the nodes
would be in some equilibrium with respect to the asset and the threat. This would occur
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either when there is no threat in the sensing range of the nodes, in which case the nodes
would settle in the “trough” of the asset’s potential field function, or when the nodes are
trapped between the attractive force of the asset (Fan), and the attractive force of the threat
(Ftn), while being repelled from each other by the intra-nodal forces (Fnn). Given the con-
figuration in Figure A.2, the threat’s progress towards the asset can be stopped by choosing
parameters that satisfy (A.4).
−Fn1t sin θt1 +−Fn2t sin θt2 > Fat
−2 · ηrt(dn1t − ddnt) sin θt1 +−2 · ηrt(dn2t − ddnt) sin θt2 > αat
−2 · ηrt ((dn1t − ddnt) sin θt1 + (dn2t − ddnt) sin θt2) > αat
− αat
2 · ((dn1t − ddnt) sin θt1 + (dn2t − ddnt) sin θt2)
< ηrt, dn1t < ddnt, dn2t < ddnt
(A.4)
Again, using (A.4) the desired parameters can be calculated that will ensure asset pro-
tection using two nodes against one threat as defined in Figure A.2.
This derivation is commonly used as these two nodes will be the most influential in
repelling a threat, though other nodes may exert a repulsive influence on the threat.
A.3 R nodes, T threats Scenario
Given (A.4) a general equation can be written to find the parameters necessary to ensure
asset protection against T threats. This equation does not take into account intra-threat
forces, however, each threat can be repelled individually assuming that a threat cannot
push a node out of position.
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− αat





r(dnrt − ddnt) sin θtr)
< ηrt, dnrt < ddnt (A.5)
A.4 Derivation of ηrt Coefficient
Assuming that there are six nodes equally distributed around the asset with each node ddrn
away from the asset then the angle between each node is θn.
Given six nodes, θn = π3 , the distance between two nodes can be calculated:
dnn = ddrn (A.6)
Knowing the positions of the nodes with respect to the asset, parameters can be chosen
for the potential fields in order to repel the threats from the assets using the given number
of nodes and their positions. The primary force equations governing the threat movements
follows from (3.1) and (3.2).
Fat(dat) = αat (A.7)
Fnt(dnt) = −
 2ηrt(dnt − ddnt) , dnt < ddnt0 , ow (A.8)
Then in order for a pair of nodes to repel a threat, the following inequality must be
satisfied.
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Fat < Fn1t + Fn2t
αat < −2ηrt(dn1t − ddnt) sin θn1t
+−2ηrt(dn2t − ddnt) sin θn2t (A.9)
If we assume that the threat will attempt to bisect the nodes to reach the asset, then
θn1t = θn2t and dn1t = dn2t. For simplicity these variables will be condensed as θnt and dnt
respectively.
Under these assumptions, the inequality can be further simplified.
αat < −4ηrt sin θnt(dnt − ddnt) (A.10)
Now the coefficients αat and ηrt can be chosen to repel a threat given θnt and dnt. Using




3ηrt(ddrn − ddnt) (A.11)
This again is assuming that ddrn < ddnt, which if not true would mean the nodes exhibit
no repulsive force on the threat. More than the two nodes used in this derivation may act
on the threat, however that would only add to the success of the asset protection formation.
When these conditions are met the threat will be repelled to
√
3dr away from the asset.
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